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Abstract
Tax administrators are empowered by the state to secure compliance with tax obligations. Enforcing compliance on the ground 
is complex, and street-level administrators often engage in the “art of the possible,” leading to dilemmas in the field. This 
paper examines tax administrators’ practices with regard to Jamaican property tax defaulters with outstanding tax liabilities 
in excess of 3 years. Drawing on interviews with tax administrators and other key agents, we find that tax administrators 
reposition themselves from objective enforcers to empathizing officials engaging in schemes of action, doing what they can 
do rather than what they should do. This is a practical-sense approach to securing compliance. We identify two forms of 
empathy, assimilated and cynical, and conclude that administrators’ empathetic identification with defaulters does not neces-
sarily arise solely from concern for social cohesion, or inter-subjective compassion, but also sometimes from self-interest.
Keywords Dilemmas · Empathy games · Practical sense · Tax administration practices
Introduction
“We are asked to collect 15% of the arrears and 62% of 
the current years’ liabilities. What do you do,” asked a 
senior tax administrator, “when defaulters sometimes 
don’t turn up to court, when a defaulter is ill but owes 
more than a $1 m in taxes or when a defaulter hides 
from the tax authority during the regular work hours 
but can be found on a Sunday?”
Tax administrators are empowered by the state to carry 
out their main task of securing tax compliance (Bird and 
Zolt 2014; Björklund Larsen 2013, 2015, 2017; Boll 2011, 
2014; Wynter and Oats 2018), and are expected to raise 
tax revenues to enable the state to carry out its obligations 
(Bräutigam 2008; Martin et al. 2009). Defaulting taxpay-
ers must be found and made to pay. “Tax administrators … 
are specifically entrusted with powers of tax enforcement 
through tax regulations to ensure that citizens are account-
able to the state through compliance and payment of … their 
tax” (Wynter and Oats 2018). Nevertheless, enforcement on 
the ground is complex, and street-level tax administrators 
engage in the “art of the possible” (Tanzi and Zee 2001, p. 
2), that is, using unconventional methods when necessary.
In developing countries, tax administrations’ enforcement 
activities are often undermined by weak institutions, chal-
lenging socioeconomic environments (Alm and Martinez-
Vazquez 2007; Mansfield 1988; McKerchar and Evans 2009; 
Tennant and Tennant 2007; Vehorn 2011), overburdened 
court systems (Cornia and Walters 2010), and resource 
constraints. In addition, tax legislation may be insufficient 
(Gill 2000), tax rolls may be outdated (McCluskey and Fran-
zsen 2005), prohibitive cultural practices may sometimes be 
embedded in the tax administration’s practices (Nerré 2008; 
Wynter and Oats 2018), and tax morale, that is, willingness 
to pay tax, is often low (Bahl and Wallace 2007). Despite 
these challenges, the state still expects tax administrators to 
meet their revenue collection targets (Bird and Zolt 2014; 
Browde 2017). Regulation scholars note that to meet their 
objectives, street-level bureaucrats adopt various enforce-
ment styles, ranging on a continuum from legalistic, where 
they stick strictly to the rules, to accommodative, where they 
are sympathetic to the regulatee’s context (see, for example, 
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Hutter 1989; May and Winter 2000; May and Wood 2003; 
McAllister 2010; Nordin et al. 2017). Tax administrators 
with an enforcement role are a particular category of regu-
lator whose work is complicated by the need not only to 
secure compliance with regulatory requirements, but also 
to extract funds from the regulatee. They similarly have dif-
fering enforcement styles.
Recent years have seen the promotion of softer approaches 
to safeguarding compliance that involve developing relation-
ships with taxpayers. For example, Alm and Torgler (2011, 
p. 635) call for a “kinder and gentler tax administration to 
enforce compliance,” and Alasfour (2017) advocates the 
development of a trust-based culture to achieve this (see 
also Murphy 2005, 2008). Tax authorities are known to use 
friendly persuasion (Chung and Trivedi 2003) or to treat tax-
payers as customers, requiring personalized, relational inter-
actions (see Tuck 2010). Previous studies (see, for example, 
Bernstein and Lü 2008; Cullis and Lewis 1997) have shown 
that where softer approaches are used, compliance tends to 
increase. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) empha-
sizes the need for tax administrators to engage in “amicable” 
relational practices in their bids to enforce compliance on 
tax defaulters (Silvani and Baer 1997).
Despite this support, little research has been carried out 
on how tax administrators actually engage in amicable prac-
tices to enforce tax payment. In this paper, we explore the 
use of amicable practices in Jamaican property tax collec-
tion, focusing on the use of empathy in dealing with default-
ers. We draw on interviews with tax administrators and other 
key agents in the property tax field to provide insights into 
tax administrators’ relational approaches, interactions, and 
enforcement practices. In theory, property tax is difficult to 
evade, but in practice it presents enforcement challenges 
because of its complex administration (Bahl 2009; Bahl and 
Bird 2008; De Cesare 2004; Martinez-Vazquez and Sepul-
veda 2011, p. 2; Wynter 2014). We introduce a new way of 
thinking about regulatory enforcement and add to the lit-
erature on regulatory practices in the tax field (Braithwaite 
2003, 2006, 2009; Gracia and Oats 2012), and specifically 
tax administrators’ practices (Björklund Larsen 2013, 2015, 
2017; Boll 2011, 2014; Pentland and Carlile 1996; Tuck 
2010; Wynter and Oats 2018).
We find that a country’s tax administration practices 
develop not only through formal legislation, but also from 
tax administrators’ practices (Bird 2015). As Boll (2011) 
notes, street-level tax administrators can be viewed as policy 
makers in how they do their work, so it is important to under-
stand how and why they work in particular ways. Inspired 
by Bourdieu’s framework of practical sense (Bourdieu 1977, 
1998, 1990; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992), we suggest that 
empathy forms part of the individual and organizational 
enforcement practices of the Tax Administration of Jamaica 
(TAJ). We find evidence of tax administrators repositioning 
themselves from objective enforcers to empathizing officials, 
seeking to identify with defaulters’ circumstances to secure 
compliance by using two empathy games: assimilated and 
cynical. A practical-sense framework enables a better under-
standing of interactions in practice, and of tax administra-
tors’ schemes of actions—doing what they can do, rather 
than what they should do to enforce compliance.
The paper proceeds as follows: The next section outlines 
the theoretical framing of the study, including a brief discus-
sion of the notions of practical sense and empathy. The study 
is then contextualized, and the research methods explained, 
outlining how the data were collected and analyzed. Follow-
ing this, the results are presented and discussed, and conclu-
sions drawn.
Practical Sense and Empathy Games in Tax 
Practices
In the social world, agents’ dispositions interact with field 
conditions, giving agents a “feel for the game” (Bourdieu 
1990, pp. 65–66). This feel for the game is more than just 
understanding the rules of the game. It concerns aware-
ness and appreciation of the game, its complexities, and its 
“ins” and “outs,” and is a way of making sense of agents’ 
actions: “feel for the game is what gives the game a subjec-
tive sense—a raison d’etre, but also a direction, an orienta-
tion impending outcome for those who take part and there-
fore acknowledge what is at stake” (Bourdieu 1990, p. 66). 
This is a practical-sense approach. Practical sense, then, is 
an acquired system of preferences, and principles of vision 
(what we see) and division (how we classify things), as well 
as a system of durable cognitive structures and schemes of 
action that orient perceptions of and appropriate responses to 
situations (Bourdieu 1998, p. 25). In this paper, we argue that 
these schemes of action and responses are the “coulds”—the 
possibilities or games in which tax administrators engage 
to enact enforcement. Such games may not be rule-based 
because, as Bourdieu (1990, p. 103) argues, “practical sense 
does not burden itself with rules or principles, practical 
sense goes beyond rules of the field, and beyond past prac-
tices, to invent new practices.” In some fields, some agents 
(such as economists in the field of economics) are credited 
with an ability to assess objective choices rationally, and to 
self-regulate mechanisms in the field, with absolute power 
to determine preferences (Bourdieu 1990, p. 81) or preferred 
courses of action. However, within social practices such as 
taxation, accounting, and politics, agents are more inclined 
to do whatever is necessary, or resort to games to achieve 
their desired ends (Bourdieu 1990). Such game playing is 
given various labels, such as tact, skill, dexterity or deli-
cacy, but according to Bourdieu (1990), all comprise practi-
cal sense.
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In this study, we observed tax administrators engaging 
in a form of practical sense—empathy—to enforce compli-
ance. Despite a plethora of studies of empathy, there is no 
coherent definition. Head (2016) describes the concept as 
messy, personal, complex, and difficult to define (see Head 
2016, pp. 95-96), and a core capacity of humans. Others 
describe it as a basic capacity or a skill. Whether or not 
empathy is a moral virtue is subject to debate (see Battaly 
2011; Bubandt and Willerslev 2015). Lohmann (2011, pp. 
113–114) argues that it can be fostered as a skill, and notes 
that it can be neglected or developed in different ways and in 
different circumstances, and is therefore situational (Hollan 
and Troop 2011, p. 206). We take the view that empathy can 
be developed as a skill (Lobb 2017), and is not necessar-
ily tied to the moral makeup of an individual (Prinz 2011), 
but is context-dependent. We suggest that different types 
of empathy may be manifested, depending on the situation 
faced by agents, creating space for agents to switch between 
different types of empathy.
Empathy entails a perspective on another person’s 
thoughts and feelings, as if agents were experiencing and 
understanding the world from the other person’s vantage 
point (Hollan and Troop 2011, p. 3, citing Halpern 2001), 
walking “in the shoes of the other” (Head 2016, p. 102) 
while maintaining their own identity (Rufkin 2009). It also 
gives agents the capacity to both establish and maintain 
social bonds and to understand and negotiate social rela-
tionships (Gruen 2014, p. 93; Komorosky and O’Neal 2015). 
The consequences of empathy are concern for others (Coke 
et al. 1978; Hoffman 2001; Hollan 2008), “compassionate 
behaviour towards others, moral agency and ethical behav-
iour based on mercy and justice” (Hollan 2012, citing Harris 
2007, p. 169). However, empathy may not always be com-
passionate, moral or ethical, as “empathic identifications 
with others do not [necessarily] have as their goal mutual 
understanding, altruism, consolation, inter-subjective com-
passions, care or social cohesion” (Bubandt and Willerslev 
2015, p. 6; Halpern 2001; Shapiro 2014, pp. 279–280).
We identify two particular forms of empathy, assimilated 
and cynical, each tied to the type of defaulter encountered 
by the administrator. Assimilated empathy means under-
standing the other’s mind-set, driving emotions or outlook, 
but without necessarily sharing or approving of the other’s 
thoughts, feelings, and perceptions; it entails assimilating 
diverse information about the other (Coplan 2011; Galin-
sky et al. 2008; Halpern 2001, 2014; Vann 2017; Waldman 
2014) in a genuine attempt to walk in their shoes. Cynical 
empathy, on the other hand, is the strategic use of an impres-
sion of empathy in order to achieve a specific objective; it 
lacks emotional engagement and meaningful understanding 
of the other. Here, there is a sort of detachment, where con-
cern for the other is switched off, and empathy may become 
merely an intellectual exercise, remaining squarely in the 
position of “getting, acquiring, a tool to obtain an objective 
even though a good one is met” (Shapiro 2014, p. 279). Not 
all tax administrators will display either assimilated or cyni-
cal empathy, but where they do, it may be in one or other 
form, or a mixture of the two.
We find that where defaulters are more responsive, assim-
ilated empathy is used: when defaulters appear to be more 
amenable to enforcement, tax administrators are more likely 
to show genuine concern for them (Coplan 2011; Galinsky 
et al. 2008; Halpern 2001, 2014; Vann 2017; Waldman 
2014). Where defaulters are more resistant to enforcement, 
cynical empathy is more likely to come into play.
We make the case that identifying with defaulters lies at 
the heart of tax administrators’ empathic imagination. Street-
level tax administrators are able to resort to empathy games 
based on their perceptions of defaulters’ circumstances and 
responsiveness to enforcement efforts. Moving between their 
own ideas and the perspectives of defaulters, as well as iden-
tifying with defaulters’ points of view, provides tax adminis-
trators with opportunities to obtain in depth understandings 
of defaulters’ mind-sets and motivations, creating space for 
resourceful and creative practices.
Research Method
This paper derives from a wider study of property tax 
administration practices, for which interview fieldwork was 
undertaken in Jamaica in 2012, 2013, and 2016 by the first 
author. Other sources of data included articles, newspapers 
and government documents such as TAJ’s Citizen’s Char-
ter (2016), and the Auditor General’s Report (2016) which 
reviewed TAJ’s performance for approximately a 6-year 
period up to 2016.
Thirty-five face-to-face, semi-structured interviews were 
conducted over a 19-week period. Subsequent clarification 
through telephone calls, social media, follow-up interviews, 
and emails was sought from selected interviewees. Partici-
pants were purposefully selected (Creswell 2013; Marshall 
1996; Merriam 2002; Patton 1990; Silverman 2013; Tracy 
2010; Miles and Huberman 1994), and represented a wide 
range of agents, including taxpayers, senior tax administra-
tors (the Commissioner General, the Property Tax Co-ordi-
nator, two Property Tax Regional Managers and a former 
Director of Internal Revenue), tax compliance officers, cabi-
net ministers, a former prime minister, senior government 
bureaucrats, and politicians.
We solicited cabinet ministers’ and legislators’ perspec-
tives, based on their intimate involvement in the creation 
of both property tax policy and legislation. Emphasis was 
placed on tax administrators’ perspectives, owing to their 
connections and interactions with defaulters and engage-
ment with enforcement. Obtaining data on some taxpayers’ 
 C. B. Wynter, L. Oats 
1 3
compliance status was a challenge, since non-payment is 
illegal. All participants in this study are anonymized. All 
interviews except one were audio-recorded and subsequently 
transcribed verbatim. The texts were coded and thematically 
analyzed (Braun and Clarke 2006), using QSR NVivo to 
assist in analyzing and managing the data and to establish 
an audit trail (Bringer et al. 2006, p. 33).
In the initial stage of analysis, we established that inter-
viewees discussed high levels of evasion, visits to com-
munities, evaders’ responses when they are caught, and 
games played to enforce compliance. Additional analysis 
then gave us deeper insights into empathy games, revealing 
that administrators’ perceptions of defaulters influence the 
types of empathy games they play (Bubandt and Willser-
slev 2015; Coplan 2011; Halpern 2014; Vann 2017; Shapiro 
2014; Wispé 1986). This led us to the question of how do 
administrators engage in empathy games in their practice of 
enforcing payment of property tax in Jamaica?
Property Tax Administration
The Jamaican property tax is a local tax, payable annually by 
owners, occupiers, mortgagors, or anyone in actual posses-
sion of the property when payment becomes due. Property 
tax revenues are important for the survival of Jamaican local 
authorities’ infrastructural development and provision of 
local community services, such as garbage collection, street 
lighting, and community beautification (see Government of 
Jamaica 1996–National Land Policy; Local Authorities of 
Jamaica 2016). High evasion rates threaten, and occasion-
ally impair, the effectiveness of local authorities’ operations. 
Property tax administration is hampered by an overstretched 
court system, inadequacy of the legislation, lack of politi-
cal support for some enforcement strategies and outdated 
tax rolls (Cornia and Walters 2010), informal land tenure 
practices (Beale and Wyatt 2017; Clarke 1999; Wynter and 
Oats 2018), adverse socioeconomic conditions, a large infor-
mal economy, and resource constraints (Cornia and Wal-
ters 2010; Wedderburn et al. 2012), as well as taxpayers’ 
unwillingness to pay tax (Bahl and Wallace 2007), i.e., low 
tax morale. High levels of tax evasion result in significant 
arrears, reduction of which is a target for the tax adminis-
tration and a performance criterion for regional managers.
In exploring tax administrators’ empathy games, the 
empirical focus of this study was on the reminder system, a 
property tax enforcement strategy implemented in Jamaica 
in 2006 to tackle large-scale evasion. We examined how tax 
administrators use their experiential and procedural knowl-
edge to manage defaulters’ behavior, through delivery of 
assessment notices, and visits to defaulters’ properties. We 
noted how defaulters’ liabilities are enforced, and observed 
administrators’ interactions with defaulters and identification 
with defaulters’ perspectives and feelings. As a result, we are 
able to provide deeper insights into tax administrators’ prac-
tical-sense approach, as reflected in their empathy games.
The fundamental concept of the reminder system is to 
locate, visit and hand-deliver notices to defaulters, establish 
relationships with them, and bring them under the gaze of 
the TAJ, with the ultimate goal that they pay their outstand-
ing liabilities and continue to do so in future. Receipt of an 
assessment notice is a precondition for enforcement. Locat-
ing the defaulter initiates a personal interaction, providing 
tax administrators with an opportunity to identify with the 
defaulter’s circumstances (Halpern 2014), and both step into 
and step back from the defaulter’s perspective. Depending 
on the empathy game played, some defaulters may become 
more visible and more compliant with TAJ, while others 
remain outside its gaze and non-compliant.
In their practices and interactions with taxpayers, tax 
administrators are guided by the Citizen’s Charter intro-
duced in 2011. Its introduction came within the broader 
ambit of the public-sector modernization program that com-
menced in 1994 (see Government of Jamaica 2012—Report, 
Offices of the Services Commissions), but more specifically 
in response to the IMF’s tax reform conditions in its 2011 
standby agreement. Under the Charter, services are built 
around IMPACT: integrity, mutual respect, professionalism, 
accountability, customer-centric strategies, and team work. 
Its importance is underscored in TAJ’s National Compli-
ance Plan (2017/2018), articulating its focused commitment 
to its clientele, including expected service standards, tax-
payers’ rights and obligations, and appropriate channels for 
expressing grievances or complaints. Notably absent from 
the Charter is taxpayers’ right to privacy. However, this issue 
is addressed by the Jamaican Constitution, with the courts 
stipulating when taxpayers may be visited for enforcement 
purposes. Despite the absence of this provision, Financial 
Secretary, Dr Wesley Hughes, noted in the Charter that it is 
the “public’s score card for rating TAJ’s performance against 
the targets set” (see TAJ 2012), although there seems to be 
no information on how this rating can be achieved. Other 
details of the legislative requirements of the property tax are 
given in the appendix.
Performance Targets
Evidence from the field reveals that tax administrators’ 
and other revenue agents’ job tenure is predicated on them 
meeting performance-based revenue targets—15 percent 
of arrears and 62 percent of current liabilities (STA31 & 
STA32)—which are converted into hard annual and monthly 
targets for each collecting region and local authority. When 
targets are not met, reasons must be given. According to 
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a senior tax administrator (STA31), failure to meet these 
targets carries severe career consequences such as “reas-
signment,” presumably to other positions in TAJ. In extreme 
cases, it may lead to termination of employment, as stated by 
a senior government bureaucrat (GB01). Participant STA31 
continued, “when I can’t make my target, it is stressful, you 
feel like you would pull out your hair.” But another admin-
istrator, apparently unperturbed by the targets, stated, “we 
just do what we can.” This chimes with the observation of 
a mayor, who said:
Well, the government tell you what they want, but I 
don’t pay any mind to it. We do what we can do. My 
approach is that you just can’t say a percentage. We 
do the best we can with the resources we have (PP11).
 Meeting their targets is an organizing principle for admin-
istrators’ collection and enforcement practices. Although 
enforcement should ideally target all defaulters, TAJ’s col-
lection practices tend to “focus on numbers, so their enforce-
ment activity is at the big players who pay a lot of money and 
consequently, you find that a lot of persons who have been 
regularly non-compliant continue to be” (Senior bureaucrat 
GB03). However, some interviewees believed otherwise, 
stating, “in Jamaica, the big men don’t pay tax” (Senior 
bureaucrat GB06). Consequently “there are [lots of] rich 
people who are not paying,” because “TAJ seemed to target 
small taxpayers because they know it is collectable” (Tax-
payers TP24 & TP21). To meet their targets, TAJ confirmed 
that they concentrate on more feasible liabilities: “those 
with J$2000 (£13.33) or less is just not on” (STA30). Evi-
dence suggests, for example, that the general practice is not 
to enforce against some large landowners while collecting 
from others, depending on the story told by owners. Some 
owners with inaccessible land are left alone because “they 
would not want to pay” (Senior administrator STA33). In 
other cases, land is deemed accessible but “transfer of their 
land may not have been effected after sale for a certain time,” 
so even if pursued, they would be taking “a node of the deci-
sion tree that is going to lead to zero” (Senior administra-
tor STA29). Furthermore, it is known within the tax field 
that, based on their knowledge of the law and their finan-
cial resources, landowners may resist enforcement attempts 
(GB01). Therefore, tax administrators are well aware that 
enforcing compliance may embroil TAJ in lengthy legal bat-
tles, especially with “trouble delinquents” (GB01), which 
may be counterproductive, ultimately yielding no additional 
revenues. Despite the challenges associated with the court 
system, one senior administrator (STA32) noted that as soon 
as summons are served, “defaulters find the money to pay.” 
Notwithstanding their effectiveness, summonses are used as 
a last resort owing to their cost and administrative difficul-
ties. Given the field conditions (see Beale and Wyatt 2017; 
Cornia and Walters 2010; Wynter and Oats 2018), TAJ 
adopts a practical-sense approach (Bourdieu 1990, 1998) to 
enforce those liabilities they consider feasible. They “decide 
which battles to fight, which one is material, what has to 
be delivered and which ones can be won in a short time” 
(GB01).
Enforcement Processes
Collecting outstanding liabilities relies on knowledge of and 
access to defaulters (Dillinger 1992). One senior administra-
tor (STA31) advocated a perpetual access system to default-
ers: “We want a system where we can go at night, any time 
of the night, any time of the day, on a Saturday, Sunday, 
24/7.”1 The Supreme Court of Jamaica grants defaulters a 
limited right to privacy, preventing enforcement by sum-
monses on Sundays and public holidays. However, TAJ 
engages municipal officers to serve reminder notices on 
Sundays, especially near “to crunch time, end of financial 
year, to get everything we can” (STA31).
Since some defaulters are known to hide from TAJ, a 
major part of an administrator’s job involves searching for 
them (Cabinet minister PP14). According to a compliance 
officer, “I work on the road, I look for delinquent taxpay-
ers, the ones that are hiding, the ones that are not paying” 
(TCO01). On the other hand, some defaulters who are in 
full view of TAJ are not enforced against. In this regard, one 
administrator said:
I will be listening to the radio and hear some people 
talking about what government need to do. I am sit-
ting there, and I know that these people do not pay 
[property] tax. But what can I do? I have to keep quiet 
(STA31).
For those whom TAJ perceives it can enforce against, admin-
istrators decide where and for whom to search by reviewing 
the arrears register to establish the extent and conditions of 
the debt, supported by information on exact locations from 
previously caught defaulters. Compliance officers “go door 
to door, community by community” (PP12, STA31), “stay-
ing in a community until some money is collected” (STA32). 
It was revealed that gated communities have particularly 
high delinquency rates and access challenges. While some 
allow access to administrators on presentation of their iden-
tification, at others, security officers refuse entry for fear of 
losing their jobs.
1 Defaulters do not know when they will be served with summonses. 
Service times are Mondays to Saturdays, 6.00  am to 6.00  pm. 
According to a senior tax administrator (STA31), some defaulters 
avoid these times to stay outside the net. Although a Sunday service 
might improve enforcement, the legislation does not allow for this.
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Once defaulters are located, “it was very refreshing to 
have a one on one with them, as they are the same ones who 
will assist in locating other taxpayers” (STA31). However, 
one tax compliance officer (TCO01) painted another pic-
ture, reporting that some are “rude, annoying and tedious.” 
Regardless of their reactions, defaulters are served with 
their reminder notices, giving details of their current year’s 
liability, their outstanding liabilities listed year by year, and 
two options: either to settle their outstanding liability within 
15 days, or to contact the tax authority using the telephone 
number provided.
Street-level tax administrators working in the field play 
an important role, listening to and interfacing with default-
ers strategically to obtain information about their circum-
stances, their current addresses, and their connection with 
the property. This information is then used to update the tax 
roll (GB01). This brings these defaulters under TAJ’s gaze, 
providing it with more knowledge of and access to them, and 
thereby enabling it to exercise more influence over them, 
which is a key factor in collecting (Powers 2008). In addi-
tion, physically locating them and obtaining this informa-
tion significantly reduces TAJ’s search costs, ensuring that 
people entered on the roll as owners/occupiers are the true 
owners/occupiers of their land (Beale and Wyatt 2017, p.20).
Choosing option two, to contact TAJ, heralds the com-
mencement of an intense personal relationship with TAJ, 
creating opportunities for tax administrators to listen, 
become curious and build narratives of defaulters, all of 
which helps them to identify and imagine defaulters’ cir-
cumstances. When defaulters make contact with TAJ on 
the telephone number given, TAJ logs their names, contact 
details, and liabilities in its register of collections:
We have a book over there [shows first author the 
record book]. They call, we put their names, the date, 
the amount that is outstanding, and when they are 
coming into pay. They say they can pay in two weeks. 
So we give them dates, we follow up. Every morning we 
have a page, and all the persons who are scheduled to 
pay in the next few days are called (STA32).
Some defaulters face high compliance costs owing to trans-
portation challenges. A cabinet minister confirmed that, for 
some defaulters, “it costs more in transportation costs to 
go to pay the tax, than the tax itself” (PP17). Although an 
online system might solve this problem, these defaulters 
are unlikely to have access to such a system, despite inter-
net availability.2 Realizing that evasion is not necessarily a 
deliberate choice (see, for example, Hasseldine and Li 1999), 
and in keeping with its scheme to offer amicable strategies, 
TAJ’s response has been to provide outstations (temporary 
collection stations) to make it more convenient and cheaper 
for defaulters to pay. In the words of one senior administra-
tor (STA32), “we know it takes two buses to come here, 
so we try to go to them,” showing consideration for their 
circumstances. However, providing outstations raises dilem-
mas such as threats of violence against staff, and theft of 
collections, a perennial issue in Jamaican society (Harriott 
2003, p. 285). Outstations are therefore carefully planned 
with due cognizance of both convenience and safety issues. 
With regard to safety, TAJ often places outstations at police 
stations, as well as engaging security personnel to accom-
pany staff. One tax administrator described this process:
We go out in the rural area and do the collections, and 
that is when we have security. The police just give us 
a little area and people come in and pay; at least we 
know that we are secured. But we have to make sure we 
have security to take us back with the money (STA31).
In terms of convenience, the practice is to place outstations 
in rural areas, open at weekends and outside normal working 
hours to make it easier for defaulters who find it challeng-
ing to use the regular stations or the online portal. This is a 
practical-sense approach to enforcement.
Empathy Games
Given the system of property tax administration and the field 
conditions outlined above, how can tax administrators do 
their job effectively? Among other practical-sense strate-
gies, we found evidence of two forms of empathy games: 
assimilated and cynical. Each type relates to the tax admin-
istrator’s own empathetic imagination and perception of the 
type of defaulter encountered. Where a defaulter is perceived 
to be more responsive, assimilated empathy is often applied. 
Cynical empathy, on the other hand, tends to be reserved for 
those viewed to be uncooperative and less receptive to TAJ’s 
overtures. We now discuss each in turn.
Assimilated Empathy
Evidence from our study suggests that some tax adminis-
trators’ identification with and imagination of defaulters’ 
circumstances, through multifaceted empathetic processes 
(Coplan 2011; Halpern 2014; Vann 2017), results in them 
showing genuine concern for defaulters. These processes 
include listening, personal interactions, following narra-
tives of defaulters’ experiences, becoming curious about 
defaulters’ circumstances, and offering appropriate support 
to enforce compliance.
2 Jamaica has a huge informal economy (Gill 2000), believed to 
amount to 40 percent of its GDP (see Wedderburn et al. 2012). This 
limits defaulters’ access to credit cards, a condition for using an 
online system (see also Graham 2016).
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Administrators’ game plan of visiting, recording, and 
calling is in keeping with TAJ’s vision of professionalism 
and customer centricity (Citizen’s Charter 2016). During 
these calls and visits, the evidence suggests that defaulters 
provide information about their varied personal situations, 
to which administrators listen. One interviewee observed:
Sometimes we act as social workers, just listening to 
their problems; sometimes what they are telling us, we 
don’t even need to know. Sometimes they tell us stuff 
and we just sit down and listen, and you empathise and 
you do whatever it is to make them comfortable or feel 
free to speak with you, and see that you understand 
what they are going through, you are not there to bring 
them down (STA32).
 Empathetic tax administrators use listening and interper-
sonal interactions to understand, interpret, and imagine 
defaulters’ situations (Komorosky and O’Neal 2015). In 
doing so, they gain a first-person perspective on defaulters’ 
thoughts and feelings (Head 2016, p. 102; Hollan and Troop 
2011, citing Halpern 2001), which elicits concern, compas-
sion, and sensitivity.
Further evidence of tax administrators’ assimilated empa-
thy is seen in how they absorb and assess knowledge gained 
of defaulters’ circumstances; for example, “their arrears were 
too large,” “they could not afford property tax,” “they didn’t 
know that they could pay their tax in installments,” “they 
forgot to pay,” or “could not pay because they were sick” 
(STA31, STA32, TCO01, TP36). Seeing the world through 
their eyes (Head 2016; Hollan and Troop 2011, p. 3, citing 
Halpern 2001) and looking behind these statements enables 
empathetic administrators to make more accurate assess-
ments (Halpern 2014). Identifying with their situations, an 
administrator said, “I know people are fighting hard times, 
so we are flexible and are willing to work with [them]” 
(STA31). Despite the legislative requirement to settle out-
standing liabilities within 15 days, “we accommodate them, 
whatever they have,” (STA32),“no matter how small it is, it 
is better than nothing” (TCO01), “even if it’s J$100, we take 
it” (GB01). Some defaulters are micro-managed (STA32) 
and coached into planning and budgeting, encouraged to 
save small amounts on a regular basis so they can pay their 
tax. Administrators drew parallels between the property tax 
and defaulters’ household bills, as it had been found that 
some defaulters “planned for everything else, even parties, 
but they don’t plan how they will pay their property taxes” 
(PP11). Such actions reflect tax administrators’ sensitivity to 
defaulters’ difficult circumstances (May and Winter 2000), 
giving them some sort of “compassionate space” (PP14), 
but at the same time ensuring that some revenues are col-
lected. One defaulter welcomed these practices, noting that 
it is easier to pay: “they don’t pressure you, I try not to allow 
my taxes to mount up” (TP26). On the other hand, some 
defaulters scoffed at TAJ’s concern, and instead retorted, 
“they have no teeth, they are weak” (TCO04).
Payment plans, coaching, and budgeting may be seen as 
attempts to improve defaulters’ accountability and main-
tain social bonds (Gruen 2014), making them law-abiding 
and thus socially adjusted citizens (Komorosky and O’Neal 
2015), which ultimately shapes their morality (Björklund 
Larsen 2017). Although such practices may be seen as 
expressions and outcomes of empathy (Björklund Larsen 
2017; Hoffman 2001), they raise the question of whether 
TAJ is fulfilling its ethical mandate to bring justice to the 
tax field. Defaulters may feel that they are treated fairly, 
listened to and have a voice, all of which contribute to 
improving trust, loyalty, and commitment to the tax author-
ity, ultimately increasing compliance (Kornhauser 2006, p. 
615; OECD 2010). However, since the law has been broken, 
the full weight of the law should be applied; yet defaulters 
are allowed to negotiate payment terms, which means they 
continue to use services paid for by other taxpayers, thus 
raising issues of retributive and distributive justice (Elkins 
2009). Given the field conditions, such as the overburdened 
court system, payment plans are probably the only effective 
strategy for collecting and possibly fostering future compli-
ance (Levi 1988; Murphy 2005, 2008; Nordin et al. 2017). 
As empathetic as such actions may be, they do not necessar-
ily equate to tax justice because they potentially affect other 
taxpayers and may lead to evasion by otherwise compliant 
taxpayers. This is a dysfunctional response in the field.3
Cynical Empathy
Empathy does not always take on the hue of moral agency, 
with ethical behavior based on mercy and justice (see Hollan 
2012); it may have a dark side (see Bubandt and Willserslev 
2015; Shapiro 2014; Wispé 1986). Some agents use their 
understanding of the “other” to project themselves using 
subtle coercive tactics, demonstrating a sort of detached 
concern. This is evident in how TAJ deals with defaulters 
perceived to be less responsive, those it argues “just don’t 
want to pay,” for which “they accepted no excuses” (STA31). 
Such defaulters include those who miss payment deadlines 
or fail to respond to TAJ’s reminders. Those who miss pay-
ment deadlines are aggressively pursued and hounded with 
incessant phone calls.
3 Tax administrators target those who are more likely to pay, because 
this is more cost-effective and efficient (Silvani and Baer 1997) and 
allows targets to be met more easily. However, this may become dys-
functional. One taxpayer said, “I am annoyed with how they went 
about dealing with the outstanding amount owing for property tax, 
and persons who normally pay become delinquent as well.”
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Sometimes they are tired of us calling. We put on the 
pressure and then you find out that they will come in. 
And they would say, “you know I don’t get the money 
yet” and our response would be “but you gave us a 
date, and the last time you told us you didn’t come.” 
We just continue calling until we get most of them [to 
pay] (STA32).
Where the legislation is deemed inadequate, “the strategy is 
a mix of persuasion and veiled threats” (STA29).4 However, 
“if defaulters are aware that we don’t have the power, we not 
getting ‘zilch’ [nothing] from them” (STA30). For defaulters 
who consistently ignore reminders, “we try to bluff them” 
(Mayor PP07) by placing “for sale” signs on their proper-
ties. On seeing these signs, the defaulters will contact the 
government, even though some take a long time to do so. 
Defaulters who owe tax for more than 6 years are made to 
think that there is a likelihood that they may be asked to pay 
the outstanding tax beyond the statute bar, along with fines 
and penalties:
If the government should go back in time and to collect 
and say this is what you owe, and then you have to pay 
penalty and interest on the outstanding amount, then 
this is not good for you. Make your arrangement and 
pay it off (Compliance officer TCO03).
Not all defaulters buy into this, as some are “unruly had to 
be summons [sic]” (TCO03). Those with very large balances 
who make no attempt to pay despite TAJ’s contact are prose-
cuted without regard for their personal welfare. For example:
We have a defaulter who is not paying. He is now ill. 
He bought the land for agricultural purpose and he 
got ill. His wife is also sick. He owes property tax for 
over a J$1 m. It is a lot of money, so we took him to 
court (STA32).
While some defaulters respond immediately for fear of 
additional debt, embarrassment, and losing their property 
(TPC14, TCP15), others take a long time to respond (PP14). 
When they respond to TAJ, it creates space for tax adminis-
trators to display empathetic concern, as “perceiving another 
person to be in distress prompts helping behavior” (Marsh 
2014, p. 197, citing Clark and Word 1974).
The foregoing actions seem less benevolent than patiently 
“cajoling defaulters into compliance” (Hutter 1989, p. 156). 
The literature suggests that sometimes, in everyday life, 
empathy needs a filter for agents to select what they react 
to, switching off concern for others to secure their objective 
(Bubandt and Willerslev 2015; Hutter 1989; Wispé 1986). 
Tactics such as incessant calling, veiled threats, bluffing, and 
taking defaulters to court when both partners are sick might 
be construed as concern switched off, designed to create 
distress and fear (Bubandt and Willerslev 2015; Wispé 1986) 
with a view to securing instant compliance (Hutter 1989).
Tax administrators’ actions may not always reflect a 
deeply held commitment to enforcing compliance, but rather 
a response to being evaluated with reference to revenue tar-
gets. Empathy is applied cynically. Although a moral good 
is achieved, such actions induce distress in some default-
ers, reflecting a disconnect with TAJ’s stated organizational 
ethics (see, for example, Bobek et al. 2010). Since meeting 
targets determines their career future, tax administrators’ 
enforcement actions are self-interest-oriented, and there-
fore strategic (Swartz 1997). Administrators play a cynical 
empathy game (Bourdieu 1990), enforcing compliance not 
as “conscious conformists to the regulations but as strate-
gists … moving through a maze of constraints and oppor-
tunities … through past experience and over time” (Swartz 
1997, p. 99).
Discussion and Conclusion
This paper provides deeper insights into practices adopted 
by tax administrators to tackle large-scale tax evasion by 
defaulting individual property taxpayers. Specifically, it 
has explored how tax administrators adopt practical-sense 
approaches to enact amicable relational enforcement (Alas-
four 2017; Alm and Torgler 2011; Chung and Trivedi 2003; 
Tuck 2010), and how enforcement practices are shaped by 
tax administrators’ and defaulters’ dispositions, cognitions, 
and sentiments (Bourdieu 1990; Bubandt and Willerslev 
2015; Swartz 1997). Specifically, we have examined tax 
administrators’ empathy games, deepening our understand-
ing of why and how tax administrators act as they do to 
arrive at decisions. We note that tax administrators are able 
to switch between two types of empathy—assimilated and 
cynical—in enforcing compliance. Each type is not neces-
sarily tied solely to their moral makeup, but also to their 
perceptions of defaulters, implying that empathy is circum-
stantial (Hollan 2011, p. 206). Where empathetic administra-
tors perceive defaulters to be more responsive, assimilated 
empathy is applied, showing some concern for defaulters. 
On the other hand, where defaulters are perceived to be less 
responsive or unresponsive, administrators take a more tacti-
cal approach to enforcement, displaying a sort of detached or 
switched off concern that might be construed as a harsh and 
deceptive example of cynical empathy. Each type of empa-
thy reflects the level or type of justice applied to defaulters.
Our research conceives taxation as a social prac-
tice (Boden et al. 2010) and, in conceptual terms, as an 
4 One interviewee (STA29) conceded that the approach of using 
veiled threats is not a good enforcement strategy as it involves “mak-
ing up the law as you go along” (STA29), which he argued sets a bad 
precedent for future tax administrators.
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institution undergirded by agents’ “dispositions, cognitions 
and sentiments” (Bird 2015). The study reveals that incen-
tives facilitate vicarious tax practices where administrators 
engage in the “art of the possible” (Tanzi and Zee 2001, p. 
2), creating new practices in the field (Bourdieu 1990), and 
giving them space to fulfill their self-interests. Unlike pre-
vious work on softer approaches to tax practices, this study 
provides deeper insights into tax administrators’ everyday 
approaches to enforcement, shaped by their practical sense.
Inspired by Bourdieu’s concept of practical sense, we 
have explored how empathy becomes a part of the enforce-
ment game, and how tax administrators alter their positions 
from being objective law enforcers to becoming strategic 
empathizers in the enforcement game, based on their per-
ceptions of defaulters. We have provided deeper insights 
into tax administrators’ actions, showing how identification 
with defaulters creates opportunities for innovative and new 
practices in the tax field. Such practices can be perceived 
as a means to an end, highlighting why practices in some 
situations do not follow normal tax logic (see Bourdieu 
and Wacquant 1992, p. 120). Thinking in terms of practi-
cal sense improves our understanding of how administra-
tors’ awareness and appreciation of the field enables them 
to interpret the field conditions, and in so doing allows for 
opportunistic responses, making anticipatory adjustments to 
the field’s demands (Bourdieu 1990). Such practical-sense 
responses and adjustments may not always be rational or 
objective, but immediate, pre-reflective, cognitive, and 
embodied, occurring under conditions that exclude distance, 
perspective, detachment, and reflexivity (Bourdieu 1990, p. 
82). Street-level tax administrators’ responses and adjust-
ments are attempts to maintain social bonds (Gruen 2014) 
by securing defaulters’ commitment to and involvement with 
the property tax to make them accountable (Wynter and Oats 
2018). This encourages them to become law-abiding and 
thus socially adjusted citizens, and is a key element of empa-
thy (Komorosky and O’Neal 2015).
In identifying two types of empathy—assimilated and 
cynical—we shed light on how tax administrators seek to 
manage defaulters’ otherwise hidden behaviors and deci-
sions (Keen 2008). The study also demonstrates how tax 
administrators are able to step into and step back from 
defaulters’ thoughts, feelings, and circumstances, and main-
tain their identities with a determined insistence on default-
ers’ alterity/otherness (Bubandt and Willerslev 2015, p. 7). 
Empathy requires both intimate engagement and a measure 
of detachment (Rifkin 2009, p. 173), and it is this detach-
ment that must be maintained to ensure a difference from 
the other. If tax administrators’ feelings spill completely into 
those of the defaulters, they will lose a sense of who they are 
as enforcers, compromising their ability to enforce compli-
ance. Thus, even though they might understand the default-
ers’ plight as if it were their own, they might be engulfed by 
it. If this were to happen, it would drown out their ability 
to be unique and separate from defaulters: they are agents 
of the state and must be seen as such. This is admittedly a 
rather fragile balance for them to strike, given that empathy 
requires a porous boundary between the empathizer and the 
other that somehow allows the two beings to mingle in a 
shared mental space (Rifkin 2009). Thus, they must maintain 
a distinction from the defaulters in order to assess the degree 
to which defaulters’ qualities or responsiveness match with 
their image or perspectives.
This is a sort of paradox, the play of identification and 
“othering,” which lies at the heart at empathetic faculty 
and detached concern for “others.” For those who are more 
responsive or co-operative, assimilated empathy is used and 
the degree of separation is less wide, showing some amount 
of concern. For less responsive defaulters, cynical empa-
thy is used and the degree of separation is much wider to 
enact enforcement. Thus, empathetic identification with the 
“other” does not necessarily arise solely from inter-subjec-
tive compassion, nor concern for social cohesion, but some-
times also from agents’ perceptions of the “other.”
Tax enforcement may be hostile and even physically 
violent (Bräutigam 2008; Cullis and Lewis 1997). This 
study reveals that, even in the face of large-scale evasion, 
it need not be so when empathy is used. However, we argue 
that, hidden behind tax administrators’ “empathy games,” 
TAJ obliquely wields its power to assert its legitimacy and 
authority, revealing “subtle coercion,” as well as creat-
ing fear among some defaulters. Empathy in enforcement 
sometimes becomes a merely intellectual exercise, remain-
ing squarely situated in the ethical position where “getting, 
acquiring, a tool to obtain an objective even though a good 
one” is met (Shapiro 2014, p. 279). This is so because empa-
thetic identification with others is used as a skill rather than 
a moral virtue. Hence, agents are able to secure compliance, 
not as “conscious conformists to the regulations but as strat-
egists … moving through a maze of constraints and oppor-
tunities” (Swartz 1997, p. 99). Through their actions, tax 
administrators may unwittingly perpetuate free-riding and 
tax evasion among some classes of defaulters who remain 
“legally derelict” (Byrne 1995, p. 119), which might be con-
sidered unjust.
Governments often motivate tax administrators through 
the use of incentives to secure compliance and increase rev-
enue collection. Where incentives are narrowly focused on 
achieving revenue collection rather than increasing tax com-
pliance and tax morale, they may lead to increased corrup-
tion and harassment of honest citizens (see Gangl et al. 2019, 
p. 109), undermining justice in the tax field. As agents of the 
state, administrators are expected to act in the public interest, 
through objective enforcement of the legislation to maintain 
equity, fairness, and trust in the tax authority and in them-
selves as public servants (Murphy 2005, 2008). However, 
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this may be difficult for administrators when incentives are 
given without accompanying sets of institutional and ena-
bling organizational structures, which we believe are absent 
in this case (Mookherjee 1998 citing Klitgaard 1995). We 
therefore argue that, alongside the use of targets, policies 
should be established to ensure that institutional and organi-
zational issues such as task assignment, appropriate legis-
lation, adequate resource allocation, feedback, and evalu-
ation mechanisms are independently decided and in place 
(Mookherjee 1998 citing Klitgaard 1995), supported by an 
enabling court system (Cornia and Walters 2010) to assist 
tax administrators in their quest to maintain tax justice.
We have found that the practice of incentivized enforce-
ment without due consideration for organizational and insti-
tutional issues creates a number of dilemmas in the property 
tax field. Since tax administrators must meet their targets, to 
“fit IMF programme conditions,”5 little attention is paid to 
the makeup of collections (Auditor General’s Report 2016). 
Consequently, street-level tax administrators concentrate on 
defaulters who are least able to resist, leaving more resist-
ant defaulters outside the tax net, thereby creating differen-
tial treatment of taxpayers. These hard-to-tax individuals 
remain without relationships with the state, as “non recog-
nized beings,” having an “irrelevant presence” (see Bahl 
and Wallace 2007; Bauman 1993). Differential treatment 
of defaulters raises issues of tax injustice and unequal treat-
ment of taxpayers, calling into question procedural fairness 
(due process), and retributive (punishing non-compliance) 
and distributive (equalizing the tax burden) justice (Elkins 
2009; OECD 2010).
Enforcing a tax system is neither an easy nor a static task 
in any country (Bird and Zolt 2014), but is particularly chal-
lenging for developing countries. We have noted the level 
of tax administrators’ flexibility (May and Winter 2000) in 
bringing about compliance, in their bid to fulfill their ethical 
mandate to bring justice to the tax field and shape defaulters’ 
morality (Björklund Larsen 2017). However, this flexibil-
ity sometimes creates dilemmas. For example, outstations 
expose staff to potential violence, and add another layer of 
administrative costs to their operations. This reflects the con-
stant balance faced by tax administrators to get the job done, 
even at risk to their lives. The level of flexibility that we 
have identified in Jamaican enforcement practices also calls 
attention to the present property tax legislation (PTL) and 
whether it is appropriate to Jamaica’s current socioeconomic 
situation (Wynter and Oats 2018). This has implications for 
property tax policy. There are sound arguments for the PTL 
to be amended to reflect the socioeconomic, historical, and 
demographic circumstances of modern Jamaica, as articu-
lated by Wynter and Oats (2018). Tax administrators’ abil-
ity to improvise also calls into question their enforcement 
ethics, because in their zeal they may use questionable tac-
tics such as veiled threats, undue pressure, and bluffing, as 
seen when cynical empathy, a sort of detached concern, is 
deployed.
Tax administrators’ flexibility is also demonstrated in 
their tendency to concentrate on easier cases, as enforcement 
objectives seek not to improve tax morale but to increase 
revenue collections (Mansfield 1988). Although the tar-
gets may assist in providing adequate and steady revenue 
flows, as Bird (1992, p. 197) suggests, they may also be 
an “innocuous device to keep tax administrators up to the 
mark.” Checks and balances should therefore be put in place 
to regulate tax administrators’ enthusiasm and ensure that 
they keep within the bounds of the law.
Since the property tax is centrally managed in Jamaica, 
there is a strong argument for it to be better integrated into 
the general tax system. For example, linking the property tax 
roll with the tax registration number (TRN) database would 
obviate the need for the many intense searches that place a 
strain on already meager resources. The property tax might 
conceivably then be integrated with other TAJ enforcement 
and compliance strategies, including audit and education 
programs. Alternatively, the tax could be fully localized, 
taking its own form, which might increase tax morale rather 
than revenues (Guth et al. 2005).
This study also raises the much wider question of the 
legitimacy of the state. When a government is considered 
legitimate, citizens will accept whatever is asked or imposed 
with little protest. In Jamaica, property tax evasion rates 
remain high, raising the question of whether citizens are 
challenging the legitimacy of the state or the property tax 
itself. Are they saying that this tax is no longer relevant, 
or questioning its present form? These questions must be 
addressed by policymakers.
The tax roll has been a source of discontent for many 
years (see Cornia and Walters 2010; Auditor General’s 
Report 2016). Around 50 percent of land parcels in Jamaica 
are unregistered, making it difficult to establish the true own-
ers and occupiers of the land. This situation requires atten-
tion, as effective enforcement is largely dependent on the 
accuracy and completeness of the valuation roll. Identifying 
who is liable is of utmost importance.
One area for future research might be to examine the 
extent to which understandings of reasons for evasion gained 
through the reminder system are incorporated into tax policy 
reform, education, and the tax-drafting process. It is also 
worth considering whether using empathy brings a sustained 
5 An interviewee from the Auditor General’s Department reported 
this as an adverse effect of targets, as some taxpayers remain perpetu-
ally delinquent: “What you find is that they would have met their tar-
gets, because their targets are these numerical amounts to fit the IMF 
programme conditions, and so they focus on numbers. But you find 
that a lot of the entities and persons who have been regularly non-
compliant continue to be” (GB03).
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change in compliant behavior, and the extent to which tax-
payers’ perspectives of TAJ may change based on the use of 
empathy in the reminder system.
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Appendix: Jamaican Property Tax 
Procedures
Number of Properties and Maintenance of Valuation 
Roll
Every property (including those exempt from property tax) 
is listed on the valuation roll, totaling over 800,000. Prop-
erties are listed by district, bearing the name, nationality, 
and postal address of the property’s owner, its situation, 
description, and measurements (see Land Valuation Act 
1957). Maintenance of the roll is the responsibility of the 
Commissioner of Lands (see Land Valuation Act, SS17, 24 
& 25), who provides a copy of the valuation roll to TAJ 
on its completion or whenever there is an amendment to 
the roll. Importantly, the roll is not always accurate, which 
complicates the property tax collection process.
Tax Liabilities and Payment Cycles
Property tax, based on the unimproved value of the land, 
is payable annually by owners, occupiers, mortgagors, or 
anyone in actual possession of the property when the tax 
becomes due and payable. In 2012 the rate was J$1000 
(US$10) for properties up to J$300,000, and thereafter 0.75 
percent of a dollar for each dollar of value above J$300,000. 
In 2013 there was a rate change, whereby all properties with 
an unimproved value up to J$100,000 were charged a flat 
rate of J$1000. Properties with values exceeding J$100,000 
up to J$1 million attracted an additional 1.5 percent for every 
additional dollar above J$100,000. Properties with values 
exceeding J$1 million were subject to an additional 2.0 per-
cent for every additional dollar.
Taxpayers may pay their tax in either annual, biannual, or 
quarterly installments at any of the 29 collecting stations or 
through TAJ’s online portal. Property tax arrears are huge. 
In this regard, Tharkur (2010, p. 2) states that property tax 
revenues fell precipitously across almost all valuation cat-
egories, leading to arrears at over J$5 billion (0.5% of GDP) 
by the end of 2009, making weak enforcement a major factor 
in revenue decline (see also Beale and Wyatt 2017; Cornia 
and Walters 2010; Wynter and Oats 2018).
Governing Legislation and Enforcement Conditions
The PTL—comprising the Property Tax Act of 1903 (PTA), 
the Land Valuation Act (1957), and the Government of 
Jamaica (1867)–Tax Collection Act (TCA)—provides for 
notifications of liability through assessment notices, either 
personally served, left at the taxpayer’s address, or sent by 
registered post to the taxpayer’s address (see PTA S3(2) & 
(3)). There is a statutory bar on enforcing liabilities due for 
over 6 years, which puts pressure on the tax administration. 
For those who default, the PTL stipulates that one notice 
must be sent to them, informing them of their outstanding 
liability and requiring them to settle in full within 15 days 
of receipt of this notice. Where defaulters refuse to set-
tle as required, legal remedies include being sued for the 
arrears plus full litigation costs, creation of a lien against 
their property, or, in extreme cases, seizure and forfeiture 
of their property.
The PTL provides an exemption for those who are pov-
erty-stricken, making it mandatory for TAJ to report any 
defaulter deemed to be poverty-stricken to the Minister of 
Finance, and for tax administrators to assist such default-
ers in completing the necessary documentation to enable 
exemption.
Notices and the Mail System
The Ministry of Local Government is responsible for both 
printing and circulating assessment notices to taxpayers. 
High-value notices are hand-delivered by contracted per-
sonnel appointed by the local authorities, while all other 
assessment notices are sent by regular mail to taxpayers. 
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There is no mechanism for TAJ to ascertain to whom notices 
have been sent. Some taxpayers complain that they have not 
received assessment notices. Owing to logistics in Jamaica, 
many addresses have no door number, road or street name, 
just a district and parish. Taxpayers collect their mail from 
postal agencies in their districts or, where there are no postal 
agencies, from the post office in the nearest town to their 
district. The mail system is known to be unreliable.
Reminder System and Targets
The reminder system for property tax arrears commenced in 
2006, at which time local authorities were required to part-
ner with TAJ for arrears collection (see Ministry of Local 
Government 1993, 2003). At that time the arrears amounted 
to J$546 million, rising to J$6.4 billion in 2012/13 and to 
J$13.4 billion in 2016/17. From time to time, the government 
has had to write off large portions of property tax arrears 
through the Tax Collection Act (see, for example, Order 
No 9, 2013). To minimize the arrears write-offs, a report 
commissioned by the Office of the Prime Minister in 2010 
recommended that TAJ should “articulate the expectations 
for all members of the property tax team specifying perfor-
mance targets for each reporting period” (Cornia and Wal-
ters 2010, p. 20). Although the report did not give a specific 
start date, targets appear to have been established around 
2011/2012, as the Auditor General’s Department, in its 
report covering the 2011/2012 to 2015/2016 periods, stated 
a collection target of 20 percent for property tax arrears. 
Such targets are established through collaboration between 
TAJ, the Ministry of Local Government and Community 
Development (MLG&CD), and the Ministry of Finance and 
Public Services, subject to Cabinet approval. However, the 
MLG&CD seems to set the targets and communicate them 
to TAJ (Government of Jamaica 2016a, b–Property tax col-
lections and enforcement, Auditor General’s Report), based 
on incrementalism rather than any objective scientific prin-
ciples, according to a senior government bureaucrat. Not all 
arrears are collectable.
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